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Abstract
Beyond national peculiarities, corporate governance practice is mainly centered on the protection of
investors' rights. However, this view neglects the fundamental changes of the operating conditions of
business due to globalization and the weakening of regulatory frameworks. Weak or absent enforcement
of contracts, increasingly unfettered negative externalities of corporate action, and involvement of
private actors in the provision of public goods change the role of business in a fundamental way,
rendering it a political actor in part. Resulting in the extension of corporate power these developments
challenge the very assumptions of dominant corporate governance theory. Recurring misuse of this
power poses a threat to organizational legitimacy as well as to the legitimacy of the capitalist system of
market economy. Drawing on suggestions to restore organizational legitimacy by means of discursive
processes, we argue that corporate governance needs to become open to such processes to contribute to
the safeguarding of organizational legitimacy and therewith the legitimacy of the system of market
economy in a globalized world. Based on these considerations, basic requirements as well as limits for
an according modification of current corporate governance practice will be introduced.
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 POLITICIZED CORPORATIONS AND LEGITIMACY GAPS: 
CHALLENGES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Beyond national peculiarities, corporate governance practice is mainly centered on the 
protection of investors’ rights. However, this view neglects the fundamental changes 
of the operating conditions of business due to globalization and the weakening of 
regulatory frameworks. Weak or absent enforcement of contracts, increasingly 
unfettered negative externalities of corporate action, and involvement of private actors 
in the provision of public goods change the role of business in a fundamental way, 
rendering it a political actor in part. Resulting in the extension of corporate power 
these developments challenge the very assumptions of dominant corporate 
governance theory. Recurring misuse of this power poses a threat to organizational 
legitimacy as well as to the legitimacy of the capitalist system of market economy. 
Drawing on suggestions to restore organizational legitimacy by means of discursive 
processes, we argue that corporate governance needs to become open to such 
processes to contribute to the safeguarding of organizational legitimacy and therewith 
the legitimacy of the system of market economy in a globalized world. Based on these 
considerations, basic requirements as well as limits for an according modification of 
current corporate governance practice will be introduced. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
    Globalization fundamentally changes the operating conditions of firms in general 
and of multinational corporations in particular. Worldwide trade and foreign direct 
investment increase, the reach of transnational corporations is growing, the movement 
of capital is accelerating, and financial markets are gaining momentum. With these 
developments, the freedom of action of multinational corporations expanded 
decisively (Strange, 2000). Whereas regulatory action by state agencies still is mostly 
restricted to the territory of the respective country, the latitude of multinational 
corporations is in many cases boundless (Perraton et al., 2000). Despite the lingering 
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formal monopoly of coercion, the effectiveness of national politics can be doubted in 
cases where corporate power (Avi-Yonah, 2005) as well as problems transcend 
national borders and become global (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008). The increasing 
importance and power of multinational enterprises on the one hand and the weakening 
of the power of states to provide for legal security and guarantee enforcement of 
contracts on the other hand result in regulation gaps (Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1990). In 
this ‘post-national constellation’ political control is increasingly being replaced by 
economic steering mechanisms – money substitutes power (Habermas, 2001). As a 
result of these changes the capacity of nation states to fulfill tasks that were ascribed 
to the state in the historical constellation of territorially constituted economies 
declined and still is declining. The more societal coordination is transferred to the 
price mechanism, the less society is capable of democratic self-control (Habermas, 
2001). Therewith in many situations the neoclassical conceptualization of the division 
of labor and power between political and economic actors, according to which the 
latter need to orient to unambiguous rules created by the former (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2008), and thus can exclusively concentrate on the generation of value, does not apply 
any more. Examples for this shift of power between nation-states and corporations are 
the decrease of taxes on corporate revenues (Avi-Yonah, 2000; Hertz, 2001), the 
incapacity to pursue corporate misconduct, be it by national or by international law 
(Weissbrodt and Kruger, 2003) and the power of private rating agencies decisively 
influencing the fortune of whole countries and their inhabitants (Sinclair, 2005) . 
Furthermore, in the course of these developments corporations increasingly engage in 
activities that were traditionally seen as the domain of national states. Ranging from 
social activities (Teubner, 2000a), the provision of infrastructure and education, the 
administration of civic rights (Matten and Crane, 2005a) to involvement in 
rulemaking on the global scale (Scherer et al., 2006), and to the generation of new law 
(Teubner, 2000b), corporations take on a political role besides their generic economic 
role, ‘…ending the sharp separation between governments and private 
firms…’(Crouch, 2009, p. 397). In such ways, corporations contribute to the efficient 
solution of societal problems and thus take part in the peaceful integration of society 
on the one hand. On the other hand, societal peace is threatened by these very actors. 
Examples are political lobbying benefitting corporations at the expense of individual 
citizens (Barley, 2007), the direct violation of human rights by corporations (Kobrin, 
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2009) (e.g. the use of forced labor by Unocal in Myanmar) (Kinley and Tadaki, 2004) 
as well as the complicity of corporations with undemocratic and violent regimes (e.g. 
in the era of apardheid in southern Africa) (Muchlinski, 2001), often directly flowing 
from the devotion to the objectives of growth and profit maximization (Kinley and 
Nolan, 2008).  
Corporate contributions to the public good as well as doubtful business practices 
show that the division of labor and power between the economic and the political 
actors emerged over the last centuries gets increasingly challenged (Scherer et al., 
2009). With the soaring power and latitude of firms, their actions affect an 
increasingly wider range of individuals such as workers in complex global supply 
chains or persons affected by pollution, whereas the firms are not accountable to these 
individuals. This results in declining acceptance and rising critique of corporate 
action. In cases where the impacts of a firm’s action are perceived as unjust, the 
legitimacy, i.e. the confirmation with social norms, values and expectations, of this 
specific firm (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006) as well as of the system of market economy 
as a whole (Pies et al., 2009), which is in part reproduced by corporate action, is 
threatened. Since legitimacy is a vital condition for a firm (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) such cases potentially jeopardize the survival of the firm 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Thus, the demands for firms rise to secure their survival 
not only in economic terms, but also with respect to societal acceptance and 
legitimacy. 
In the pre-globalization era of efficient national steering mechanisms, legitimacy was 
no direct problem for business. Firstly, legitimacy of economic actors as well as of the 
economic system was provided by regulatory state agencies, generating a link to 
governmental legitimacy by protecting shareholders and consumers (Hillman et al., 
2000) as well as other stakeholders. Secondly, the invisible hand – postulated in 
classical economics as well as assumed in neoclassical economics – has worked 
sufficiently to maximize societal welfare through the maximization of individual (and 
thus also corporate) utility, legitimizing firms due to their contribution to the common 
good (Jensen, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2000). From this perspective economic efficiency 
and legitimacy converged. By safeguarding efficiency legitimacy got safeguarded as 
well (Hasse, 2005; Steinmann and Löhr, 1992), and therefore business could mainly 
concentrate on the maintenance of economic efficiency. Nowadays, one necessary 
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condition for this convergence – a functioning regulatory framework – is not satisfied 
any more in many instances. This is either due to the cross-border operations of 
multinational enterprises resulting in the incapacitiy of nation states to control these 
operations (Scherer and Smid, 2000) or due to the operation in states with insufficient 
or absent legal protection mechanisms and no means of democratic control, 
exemplified by the engagement of Unocal Corp. in Myanmar and connected 
violations of human rights (Richardson, 1997). These examples indicate that securing 
economic efficiency does not assure legitimacy in every case and that regulatory 
agencies increasingly fail to protect stakeholders that are negatively affected by 
corporate action, furthering the legitimacy deficit. Therefore firms increasingly need 
to engage in the self-supply of legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Pies et al., 
2009), actively seeing about its maintenance or reestablishment. 
Corporate governance conceived of as a mechanism that aims at guaranteeing the 
efficiency of corporations is challenged by this new situation in particular. Mainly 
referring to principal-agent theory, in the dominant conception corporate governance 
is described as a set of mechanisms and rules designated to secure the efficient 
deployment of investments in firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1999), accommodating the 
specific role of shareholders bearing risk not completely covered by means of 
contracts (Collier and Roberts, 2001; Judge 2009). In turn, it is assumed that all other 
stakeholders ‘(…) such as employees, suppliers, bondholders, communities, and 
customers are protected by contractual law and regulation’ (Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004, p. 355). Practice of corporate governance is mainly based on these assumptions 
(Davis, 2009) and also the majority of theoretical approaches (Daily et al., 2003; 
Judge, 2009) refers to this conception of corporate governance. The erosion of the 
traditional division of labor between private actors and the state has a twofold impact 
on corporate governance: Firstly, the prevailing assumptions of corporate governance 
become increasingly challenged. Contracts are not enforceable in every case, 
externalities matter more in absence of state regulation and new responsibilities are 
being assigned to corporations in the global marketplace by an increasingly active 
civil society, represented by engaged individuals (Neilson, 2010), NGOs and activist 
groups (denHond & de Bakker, 2007) as well as by vigilant media (Epstein, 2006). 
Secondly, corporate action reaches further and affects more diverse stakeholders than 
in the context of congruence between national state and economy. In addition, states’ 
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capacity to protect stakeholders affected by corporate action is limited in many cases, 
potentially undermining corporate legitimacy and thus viability, as described above. 
Besides the narrow, shareholder-centered perspective, in the literature there is a 
broader conception of corporate governance which is not only concerned with 
safeguarding the supply of new capital, but  
 (…) with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between 
individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for 
the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society’ (Cadbury, 2003).  
Following this approach, corporate governance is of central importance for rendering 
firms accountable to a wider range of stakeholders and making them capable of 
meeting the requirements of rapidly changing societal conditions and of a changed 
distribution of power between economic and political actors. Therefore we refer to 
this conception as the ‘moderating approach to corporate governance’ in the 
following. 
The first aim of this paper is to show that the dominant efficient investment 
conception of corporate governance does not adequately consider the changed 
economic and political conditions firms are increasingly confronted with. The second 
aim is to propose basic modifications to enable corporate governance to fulfill the 
function suggested in the moderating approach. Following this introduction, the 
explicit as well as implicit assumptions of the dominant conception of corporate 
governance will be delineated and their appropriateness to the currently shifting 
division of power and labor between economic and political actors will be explored. It 
will be shown, that these changes severely affect the rationale of dominant corporate 
governance and, furthermore, pose a threat to the legitimacy of single firms as well as 
for the system of market economy as a whole. In the third section, we will detail 
alternative approaches to corporate governance – team production theory, stewardship 
theory and stakeholder democracy – regarding their potential to address the problems 
resulting from increasing corporate power, decreasing steering capacity of nation 
states and the lack of functional equivalents on the international level. In the fourth 
part, a shift of the scope of corporate governance will be proposed as an adequate 
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response to these challenges. Whereas the dominanat conception of corporate 
governance as well as most alternative approaches are centered on the protection of 
contractual obligations, we argue, that the impact of corporate action is a more 
appropriate criterion to determine the scope of corporate governance.  In the fifth 
section, we discuss the capacity of democratic processes to legitimize corporate 
power. As a possible conceptual foundation for rendering corporate governance 
capable of generating legitimacy in a democrativc manner, suggestions to apply the 
approach of deliberative democracy to corporations (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; 2011) will be discussed. We will introduce the redesign of 
corporate governance according to the principles of deliberative democracy as one 
way to constitute the legitimacy of both corporations and the system of market 
economy as a whole under the new conditions of the post-national constellation. 
Finally, a short conclusion and suggestions for further research will complete this 
paper. 
WANING JUSTIFICATIONS AND RISING CHALLENGES 
The Foundations of Current Corporate Governance Theory and Practice 
    Current corporate governance theory and practice is based on an entangled set of 
assumptions and arguments. In this section these foundational assumptions 
dominating corporate governance theory and practice will be characterized.  The 
validity of these assumptions will be analyzed in the light of the fundamental changes 
of globalization. In particular, we will examine changes in the enforceability of 
contracts, the decreasing feasibility of limiting negative externalities and the 
increasing importance of private actors in the provision of public goods. Based on this 
analysis, a shift of risk from the society and the firms towards individuals will be 
identified as a threat for the legitimacy of corporations as well as of the system of 
market economy as a whole.  
The concept of corporate governance in the form as it is prevalent nowadays can be 
traced back to a change of the relation between ownership and control of businesses, 
first described by Berle and Means (1932). By subdividing the concept of firm-
ownership into several functions, Berle and Means highlighted problems arising from 
this changing relation. Their analysis was based on the observation of an increasing 
spread of shareholding. According to their study, an increase in the number of 
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shareholders of corporations diminished the capacity of individual shareholders to 
participate in the steering of corporations. Professional managers gained influence and 
the owners lost the capacity to monitor the behavior of the managers. Assuming 
utility-maximizing behavior of the managers, shareowners ran the risk of managers 
shirking or utilizing the money supplied to the company to maximize their own utility 
instead of maximizing corporate value. This situation could eventually lead to under-
supply of capital, since potential investors will not invest in a firm if they run the risk 
of having their investment deployed suboptimally. Therefore a mechanism preventing 
the managers from missing profits of the owners of capital by bad decisions or waste 
them became necessary to secure a constant supply of new capital (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Thus, from this perspective corporate governance can be described as 
a mechanism which aims at minimizing the risk borne by shareholders, who are 
regarded as the owners of a firm. 
In the course of the development of the theory of the firm, the conception of 
corporations changed: initially seen as the sum of the invested capital corporations 
were redefined as a nexus of contracts (Coase, 1937; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1996) – 
bringing into equilibrium the conflicting objectices of individuals (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Whereas most contractual partners such as employees, debtors, and 
suppliers have well defined claims towards a firm and therefore bear no risk, 
shareholders need to rely on the management to maximize their return by maximizing 
the firm value, since profit can not be determined a priori. The (residual) risk 
associated with this uncertainty is regarded as the justification for the shareholders 
having the right to appropriate the difference of revenue and cost, namely the profit 
(residual claims). Therewith the definition of shareholders as owners of a fraction of 
corporate assets was replaced by the definition of shareholders as residual claimants. 
The relation of owners and managers in the constellation of publicly traded 
corporations got formalized by principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
highlighting the situation of asymmetric information between shareowners 
(=principals) and managers (=agents) and determining the optimal relation of cost 
necessary to prevent managers from shirking and thus to determine them to maximize 
firm value and simultaneously the value of shares. Thereby, the concept of corporate 
governance got firmly anchored in neoclassical economic theory, which builds on 
restrictive behavioural assumptions of the homo oeconomicus (for a classical critique 
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of these assumptions see Simon, 1948; March & Simon, 1958). By means of this 
precise formulation, shareholder primacy got strengthened in a technical sense: since 
expression and optimization of relations more complex than the dyadic shareholder-
manager-relationship are mathematically challenging and ambiguous, alternative 
constellations got out of the focus of corporate governance theorists. 
Closely interrelated with the efficiency allegedly resulting from the maximization of 
share value is a further argument pertaining to the management of corporations. 
Accordingly, corporate governance focussing on shareholder primacy is justified in 
the following way: To render a corporation manageable, it is necessary to reduce 
environmental complexity to a degree manageable within a single-valued objective 
function – shareholder value. And furthermore, thereby managerial performance can 
be assessed by shareholders and the market for securities by means of a single value 
(Jensen, 2002). The assumption central to this justification of corporate governance is 
the view that market-based allocation is most efficient in serving the public good if 
extra-economic interferences are minimized (Hayek, 1944; Friedman, 1962; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004). According to this position, the mechanism of corporate 
governance remedies the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control in the most efficient manner by means of market-logics. The market for 
securities assesses corporate performance by means of the share price. Since market-
based allocation is seen as the most efficient way to coordinate the allocation of 
resources, any interference with this principle is regarded as a potential threat to 
efficiency and societal welfare. This argument is the basis for further justifications of 
corporate governance due to efficiency reasons. In contractarian logic, the 
maximization of the residual claims of the shareowners maximizes the overall 
productivity and value of the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This in turn is seen 
as the optimal contribution to social welfare.  The justification for this lies in the 
assumption that the output of firms is higher than the input. And since each unit 
surplus (=profit) adds to social welfare, this is maximized by the maximization of 
profits (Jensen, 2002). 
Consequently, the supposed distinctiveness of shareholders in relation to a firm can be 
seen as deeply rooted in an interrelated complex of arguments. This complex is 
composed of the conception of shareholders as owners of a firm, the contractarian 
conception of the firm, which is the prevailing view today – not only in economics 
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and management science, but also in law (Blair, 2005) –, the conception of 
shareholders as residual claimants formalized by principal agent theory, and the 
resulting considerations of efficiency both on corporate and on societal level. Being 
mutually enforcing in part, these assumptions and justifications are seldom doubted 
and constitute the basics of a major part of current dominant corporate governance 
theory and practice (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Constituent Elements of Dominant Corporate Governance 
Constituent Elements of the                                                          
Dominant Efficient Investment Approach to Corporate Governance 
epistemic and 
behavioral 
assumptions 
conception of 
the firm 
position of 
shareholders 
justification of corporate governance 
mechanisms 
sum of invested 
capital 
shareholders as 
owners of the firm     
(Berle & Means, 1932; 
Friedman, 1970) 
separation of ownership and control leads to 
agency-problems (Berle & Means, 1932) 
principal-agent theory: monitoring of managers 
(Jensen & Meckling,1976) 
single- valued objective function necessary for 
purposeful management (Jensen & Meckling,1976; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004) 
maximization of organizational efficiency (Jensen 
& Meckling,1976; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004) 
homo 
oeconomicus: 
utility maximizing 
behaviour, 
complete 
information and 
rationality, fixed 
preferences  
nexus of contracts 
(Coase, 1937; 
Easterbrook & Fischel, 
1996) 
shareholders as 
residual claimants 
maximization of societal welfare (Jensen, 2002) 
Globalization and Corporate Governance 
    Globalization has changed the operating conditions of business in a significant 
way. These changes are reflected in the business literature to some extent. In 
particular, the different consequences for corporate governance are discussed: 
blurring organizational boundaries and increasing importance of knowledge work 
(Blair, 1995; Bradley et al., 1999; Zingales, 2000), the gaining relevance of implicit 
contracts and the ongoing replacement of transactions by relations (Boatright, 2009). 
Common to these analyses is the purely economic perspective with a focus on 
efficiency and a neglect of legitimacy. 
However, as argued above, besides grave economic implications, globalization not 
only changes the operating conditions of corporations but also gives rise to a change 
of the role of the firm. Hence confining the analysis of the implications of these 
processes for business in general and for corporate governance in particular to purely 
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economic issues necessarily overlooks further reaching consequences, which, in turn, 
might become highly relevant for the firms themselves. 
In a part of the corporate governance literature, the extension of the scope of 
corporate action beyond purely economic issues is covered. Whereas the relation of 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is reflected (Bhimani 
and Soonawalla, 2005; Jamali et al., 2008), the assumptions underlying traditional 
corporate governance are barely questioned. Furthermore, beyond the reference to a 
potential incompatibility of the economic role of the firm and CSR, the rising 
incapacity of states to sufficiently regulate corporate action is not accounted for 
(Frynas, 2008) and the firms’ adoption of tasks originally fulfilled by the state is 
treated uncritically, ignoring the legitimacy problems potentially resulting from such a 
redistribution of tasks and power. 
In the following, the implications of the rapid shift of the division of labor between 
the economic and the political system for corporate governance will be discussed in 
detail. The question arising from the concentration of corporate governance on 
economic efficiency is whether the principal-agent constellation resulting from the 
divergence of firm-ownership and control is the only problem threatening the 
efficiency of and thus also the legitimacy corporations. Furthermore, since the 
efficiency of corporations is regarded as a justification for the allocative superiority of 
the capitalist system of market economy (Jensen, 2002) and thus for its legitimacy, 
the implications of the described developments for these assumptions will be 
analyzed.  
The debate about the purpose of corporations – generating value for shareowners or 
directly serving the public interest can be traced back to the second decade of the 20th 
century (Clark, 1916; for an overview see Lichner, 2009). Strongly tied to this topic is 
the debate about the function of corporate governance dating at least back to a debate 
between professors Berle and Dodd1 in the early 1930s (Weiner, 1964). Until today, 
this debate lives on in the conflicting views of shareholder primacy (Friedman, 1970; 
Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004) and the stakeholder view (Freeman, 1984; 
                                                
1 The position of Berle was that the sole function of a corporation is a private one, namely the 
generation of revenue for the owners of a corporation’s share. In contrast, Dodd argued that 
corporations have a profit-making function as well as further reaching public and social obligations. 
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Freeman et al., 2010) of the firm. Both these positions exist with different facets. For 
example, whereas some proponents of shareholder value negate any concern of 
corporate action for social issues, the position of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
allows instrumental concern for stakeholders such as shareowners, employees, 
creditors, consumers and even communities to increase profits, a position also 
common in a major part of stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997). However, 
common to the greatest part of these conceptions is the role ascribed to the nation-
state: providing a proper regulatory framework. 
In the following, three major problems arising from the diminishing steering capacity 
of states and the changing division of labor between economic and political system 
will be described: the limited capacity of many states to enforce contracts and provide 
for a functioning regulatory framework in every instance; the increasing relevance of 
negative externalities resulting from the weakening of states; the legitimacy problems 
arising from the provision of public goods by corporations. Subsequently the core 
common to these problems will be formulated in terms of a changing allocation of 
risk away from the state and the society as a whole and towards the individuals. 
Enforcement of contracts 
One of the basic assumptions of the contractarian view of the firm in general and of 
the theory of corporate governance in particular is the enforceability of contracts. As 
described above, shareholder primacy implied by the contractarian conception of the 
firm is justified by the alleged comprehensive protection of a firm’s stakeholders 
(except shareowners) through contracts and the legal system (Bradley et al., 1999; 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004), emphasizing the important role the “(…) legal system 
and the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic 
activity (…)” and the availability of “(…) police powers of the state (…) used to 
enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
With corporations operating out of the reach of legal enforcement mechanisms, be it 
in weak states or in undemocratic ones, the option of the legal enforceability of 
contracts becomes curtailed. The existence of claims vis-à-vis a corporation resulting 
from any kind of contract must not be seen as a guarantee for the fulfillment of these 
claims. Thus claimants often are exposed to the arbitrariness of corporate actors.  
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Scarcely realizing this fundamental shift, suggestions to respond to this threat to the 
contractarian view still operate in a pre-globalization logic, postulating some 
‘worldwide contracting infrastructure’ on the one hand and suggesting enforcement of 
contracts by firms themselves on the other hand (Bradley et al., 1999), disregarding 
potential corporate wrongdoing and severe legitimacy-problems resulting from 
private corporations taking over state-functions without democratic legitimization 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Negative Externalities 
A further aspect of the increasingly limited capacity of states to enforce laws relates 
to externalities such as environmental pollution (Beck, 1992) and the violation of 
human rights (Kinley & Nolan, 2008). While in the constellation of national 
economies negative externalities could be limited or compensated by public policy 
and by means of law, this option becomes increasingly unviable. Admitting that the 
maximization of shareholder value does not maximize social welfare when 
externalities exist, Jensen (2002, p. 246) exlicitly relies on ‘(…) the government in its 
rule-setting function (…)’ to create the conditions necessary to resolve externality 
problems. However, where no enforcing mechanisms exist (see above), ban or 
prevention of negative externalities by means of taxation (Pigou, 1932) as well as 
solutions proposing the internalization of externalities by the allocation of property 
rights (classical: Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1984) are only viable to a limited degree, 
since contractual obligations between stakeholders and firms cannot be enforced. Due 
to the globality of many problems produced by corporations, as in the case of climate 
change and toxic emissions, or due the inaccessibility of legal protection, as in the 
case of insufficient labor rights, different groups of stakeholders are increasingly 
exposed to risks resulting from externalities generated by corporations without the 
chance of legal protection. 
Besides the problem of negative externalities in general, the problem of externalities 
originating from the properties of dominant corporate governance, i.e. the 
concentration on shareholder value and its ‘distasteful implications’ (Tirole, 2001), 
has to be considered. The concentration on shareholder value leads to a bias of 
decision-making to the disadvantage of noncontrolling stakeholders (Blair, 1995) and 
to a focus on short-term value generation at the extent of the long-term stability of 
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firms (Prahalad, 1994). In particular, these problems are becoming increasingly urgent 
in the light of the diminishing steering capacity of states and the resulting decreasing 
protection of these stakeholders by means of law. 
Public Goods    
Strongly interrelated with these developments is the increasing power of business in 
general and of multinational enterprises in particular. In opposition to the widespread 
fear that the power of the state might become too strong and thus hamper the 
efficiency of markets (Hayek, 1944), nowadays a multitude of tasks assigned to the 
state in liberal models is fulfilled by business: firms provide schooling and 
infrastructure and engage in the administration of rights (Matten and Crane, 2005a); 
they provide security services (Elms & Philips); and they participate in global 
governance through the formulation of international standards (Scherer et al., 2006), 
e.g. in areas such as labor standards and environmental protection (Haufler, 2001).  
These examples for the engagament of corporations in the provision of public goods 
indicate that corporations exert significant power (Coglianese, 2007), which in many 
cases equals or even exceeds the power of state actors. Whereas in constitutional 
states, power exercised by the state can be controlled by democratic processes, in the 
post-national constellation corporate state-like power is often uncontrolled. In such 
situations individuals thus become exposed to corporate power and need to rely on 
corporate benevolence. The result of this deficit of control is that corporate power 
potentially can be used to benefit specific interests and place others at a disadvantage 
(Banerjee, 2008).  
The Individualization of Risk 
    Summing up, the growing power of corporations and the simultaneous decline of 
regulatory power of nation states in the post-national constellation brings about that 
individuals are increasingly directly exposed to the harmful consequences of 
corporate activity. Functioning democratic states use their monopoly of power to 
secure compliance with contractual arrangements by means of law and to either 
allocate the costs of negative externalities to their producers or to the society as a 
whole. As the sole providers of public goods they are controlled democratically and 
thus misuse of power is prevented. Furthermore, due to its democratic legitimization, 
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this exercise of power by states is regarded as legitimate by individuals. Thus the state 
system acts as a mechanism minimizing and mitigating risk as well as limiting and 
socializing potential costs for the single citizen. Under conditions of insufficient 
regulation, many risks resulting from corporate action that were traditionally attended 
to by regulatory frameworks and therefore mitigated are becoming virulent for 
individuals. In other words: the risk gets individualized (Beck, 1992). This re-
allocation of risk from the risk-producers and the societal level to the individual 
undermines the justification of dominant corporate governance questionable. 
Accordingly the exceptional role of shareowners is justified by the exceptional 
situation of shareowners who bear risk through investing in corporations (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and the derived justifications described 
above. All other stakeholders of a firm are assumed to be parties in explicit contracts 
enforceable by means of law if necessary. Due to the increasing incapacity of states to 
limit and mitigate risk resulting from corporate action, now a much broader array of 
individuals and groups is subject to risk produced by corporate action. This 
individualization of risk resulting from corporate action therefore immediately 
contradicts the basic assumptions of dominant theory and practice of corporate 
governance. 
Losing Hold: Corporate Governance and Legitimacy 
   In this section we argue that – apart from rendering the basic assumtions of 
dominant corporate governance theory questionable – the changes described above 
pose a severe threat for the legitimacy of single firms as well as for legitimacy of the 
capitalist system of market economy as a whole. Legitimacy, as defined by Suchman 
(1995, p. 574), “is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. In cases of perceived injustice and harm 
resulting from corporate action, corporations are increasingly addressed directly by 
affected groups or activists (Spar and La Mure, 2003; Zadek, 2004). Critique can 
spread through media and new communication technology without time delay, and 
thus corporate legitimacy potentially gets questioned globally. 
Following the concept of legitimacy proposed by Suchman, legitimacy can be 
regarded as socially constructed. In the process of social construction (Berger and 
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Luckmann, 1967) legitimacy is ascribed to an entity due to the congruence between 
the behaviors of this entity and the beliefs of the social group granting legitimacy. As 
described above, the erosion of national steering capacity and the accompanying 
increase of corporate power result in the problems of lacking enforceability of 
contracts, externalities, and public goods. Being involved in these problems and often 
regarded as their causes, the capacity of corporations to gain legitimacy, for the most 
part by generating value – the mode viable in the pre-globalization era – is 
diminishing (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). While under conditions of intact regulatory 
frameworks and in relatively homogenous environments corporate legitimacy resulted 
from the economic value generated by corporations (i.e. pragmatic legitimacy) and 
the taken-for-grantedness of corporations (cognitive legitimacy), in part an outcome 
of state regulation (Hillman et al., 2000), these sources of legitimacy are becoming 
less reliable. Therefore the legitimacy of corporations as organizations and as 
representatives of the predominant economic order – market economy – is 
increasingly challenged in several respects and a third type of legitimacy (moral 
legitimacy) is becoming increasingly relevant (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). This type of 
legitimacy rests on the judgment about whether an activity is “the right thing to do”, 
which mainly rests on discursive evaluation, taking place within explicit public 
discussions (Suchman, 1995).  
The legitimacy of a firm can be regarded as a consequence of its productivity, 
competitiveness and viability (Monks and Minow, 1995), which are the concern of 
the interplay of shareholders, managers and directors in traditional corporate 
governance. Following the assumption that corporate governance secures market 
efficiency and therefore maximizes social wealth (O’Sullivan, 2000), it can be 
described as contributing to the legitimacy of the single firm as well as to the 
legitimacy of the system of market economy by improving the efficiency both on 
company and market level. Insofar, besides the function to guarantee sufficient supply 
of money for a corporation on the firm-level, corporate governance contributes to the 
efficiency of the market economy and therefore to its legitimacy on the macro-level of 
society.  
 
Legitimacy on the Firm Level: the traditional view 
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    Seen from the perspective of new organizational institutionalism, legitimacy can be 
regarded as a necessary condition for organizational survival (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), positively affecting the availability of resources 
necessary for organizational survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008). In a narrow view, corporate governance can be regarded as one 
mechanism legitimizing a corporation through the appointment of a corporate board 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In a broader view, corporate governance can be 
conceived of as a set of rules aiming at risk-reduction and thus as a mechanism of 
guarantee, as described by Gomez and Korine (2008). By means of proper corporate 
governance, a corporation signals sound risk-control towards potential shareholders, 
thus enhancing their trust in the corporation and minimizing potential transaction 
costs resulting from the collection of information about eventual risks. 
In the light of the rising complexity of organizational environments due to processes 
of globalization, the management of legitimacy is becoming more and more difficult. 
Firstly, corporations are often confronted with allegations concerning violations of 
human rights and labor standards, pollution and other problematic issues (Palazzo and 
Scherer, 2006) raised by an increasingly sensitized civil society (Doh and Teegen, 
2001). Secondly, global activity in heterogeneous environments still advances the 
problem of corporate legitimacy since corporations on the one hand have to adapt to 
local conditions (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and on the other hand need to keep their 
identity as an organization. Therefore traditional corporate governance, being adapted 
to the conditions of the pre-globalization era, is becoming less effective in 
contributing to organizational legitimacy. 
Legitimacy on the Systems Level 
    Besides the necessity of organizational legitimacy for the survival of an individual 
firm, legitimacy can be defined as a necessary condition for the sustained stability of 
the economic system of market economy as a whole. Assuming that the system of 
market economy derives its legitimacy from its efficiency in resource allocation 
(Steinmann and Löhr, 1992), inefficiency on the firm level indirectly threatens the 
legitimacy of the economic system. Corporate governance as a mechanism to secure 
firm-level efficiency thus can be regarded as indirectly contributing to the legitimacy 
of the economic system. This is in line with shareholder primacy view and a 
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contractarian conception of corporate governance emphasizing the special need for 
protection of shareholders and at the same time the thorough protection of all other 
stakeholders by enforceable contracts and state regulation (Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004). 
As soon as it is conceded that the maximization of share value is not equivalent to 
maximizing the total social value created by a firm (Blair, 2003), the justification of 
the privileged relation of shareholders and corporations (e.g. Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004) becomes questionable. As emphasized by the notion of the market as a fragile 
system, the societal function of the market – contribution to the public good – can be 
disrupted by the actions of its actors (Dubbink, 2004). Furthermore, it can be argued, 
that sustained dysfunctions of the market mechanism undermine the conditions for its 
very existence. 
Since the assumptions underlying traditional corporate governance are not valid any 
more in every case, as shown above, the capacity of corporate governance to 
contribute to the securing of legitimacy both on firm and on systems level gets 
increasingly impaired. Corporate legitimacy can be regarded as constituted firstly by 
corporations themselves, inter alia by corporate governance. Corporate governance 
conceived of as one means to contribute to corporate legitimacy by ensuring a ‘fair 
distribution of outcomes over the long term’ (Gomez and Korine, 2005, p. 741), 
contributes to the pragmatic legitimacy of a corporation. Secondly, corporate 
legitimacy gets inter alia constituted by corporate regulation enforced within a 
regulatory framework (Hillman et al. 2000). Under conditions of increasingly 
imbalanced distribution of wealth, the constitution of pragmatic legitimacy becomes 
increasingly difficult. In cases in which states are incapable of providing a reliable 
regulatory framework, possibilities to generate cognitive legitimacy become 
constrained. With weakening law and order, the legitimacy of corporate governance is 
in decline (Judge et al., 2008). This can be interpreted as a lack of adaptation of 
corporate governance to the changed conditions described above: while economic 
efficiency is still safeguarded, corporate governance does not contribute to the 
attainment of societal welfare any more, and thus legitimacy is threatened. In other 
words: with changing economic and political conditions, corporate governance is 
becoming dysfunctional in part. The challenge therefore lies in modifying corporate 
governance according to these changing conditions, and enabling it to generate 
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corporate legitimacy. Since the pragmatic as well as cognitive legitimacy are 
increasingly at stake in many situations, the generation of moral legitimacy seems to 
be the only viable alternative. The question is how to keep the advantages of 
traditional corporate governance while enabling it to balance the interests of 
individuals, corporations, and of society? 
 
IN SEARCH OF NEW PRINCIPLES 
    Contesting conceptions of the purpose and objectives of a corporation and therefore 
of the adequate focus of corporate governance are discussed at least since the second 
decade of the last century (see above). Moral arguments (Freeman et al., 2004) as well 
as the reconsideration of theoretical foundations of traditional corporate governance 
(Blair 2003; Davis et al., 1997) triggered the development of alternative approaches to 
corporate governance. Each of these alternative approaces can be interpreted as an 
attempt to remedy specific deficiencies of traditional corporate governance. With the 
aim to find corporate governance mechanisms able to cope with the challenges 
resulting from the postnational constellation, in the following, the most influential of 
these approaches will be analyzed regarding their potential to overcome the flaws of 
dominant corporate governance: their reliance on the legal enforcement of contracts, 
their potential to limit negative externalities and their capacity to respond to 
legitimacy gaps resulting from corporate provision of public goods. 
Team Production Theory 
One attempt to modify corporate governance is team production theory (Blair, 1995; 
Blair and Stout, 1999). As described above, traditional corporate governance is 
conceptualized for overcoming the principal-agent problem which is seen as 
essentially threatening the efficiency of a corporation defined as a nexus of contracts. 
Team production theory is based on the definition of organizations as teams (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972), in which team members jointly contribute input to generate 
output. However, diverging from the conclusions of this initial concept, in team 
production theory the board’s task is not the protection of a single principal (the 
shareholder) from the potentially shirking group disposing over the input (the 
managers). The core argument of team production theory is based on the increasing 
importance of implicit contracts and the resulting shift of risk towards stakeholders, 
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particularly the employees. These become risk-bearers by (in part irrevocably) 
investing firm-specific skills in a team production effort – the firm – and thus 
contributing to value creation. While the risk of shareholders is limited by the amount 
of money invested (but without limited upside potential; see Lan & Heracleous, 
2010), in case of layoff employees can ’reinvest’ their skills elsewhere only to limited 
extent due to firm-specificity. Therefore, the adequate focus of corporate governance 
is seen rather on the mediation of ‘…disputes among team members about the 
allocation of duties and rewards’ (Blair and Stout, 1999). Aim of this is the 
motivation of team members to actually contribute to the process of value creation as 
well as the increase of information available for decision-making on board-level 
(Osterloh & Frey, 2006).   
The credit of this approach to corporate governance lies in taking into account the 
changing risk-constellation within corporations, dethroning the shareholder as the 
residual risk-taker and the sole party in need of additional, extra-legal protection. 
Thus an exclusive reliance on contracts, prevalent in traditional corporate governance, 
is no condition for the functioning of team production theory. However, regarding the 
increasing importance of negative externalities, team production theory is constrained 
by the definition of organizations as teams and the resulting focus on team members. 
Team members join a team and invest in a project voluntarily, expecting some kind of 
reward for their investment. From this follows necessarily, that individuals and groups 
affected by corporate action without making some kind of investment and thereby 
voluntarily joining a bilateral relation can not be regarded as team members. 
According to team production theory, risk imposed on them by a corporation thus can 
not be considered within corporate governance and thus avoidance of negative 
externalities is limited to the members of the team. Moreover, and connected with the 
exclusive focus on team members, team production theory does not take into account 
the legitimacy gaps resulting from the provision of public goods by private actors. 
Accordingly, team production theory is capable to respond to the challenges posed by 
the shifting division of labor between firms and the state only to a limited degree, 
since only the focus of stakeholder-protection is widened, not taking into account the 
necessity of increased external control. 
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Stewardship Theory 
    In line with the theory of team production, stewardship theory represents a further 
theoretical critique of the principal-agent theory. Whereas team production theory is 
based mainly on a critique of the dysfunctionalities of shareholder primacy (Blair, 
2003), stewardship theory is based on a critique of the assumptions constitutive for 
shareholder primacy. The behavioral premise of principal-agent theory is the homo 
oeconomicus depicting humans as rational utility maximizers, who act opportunisticly 
to maximize individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Based on psychological 
and sociological considerations, this view is shown to disregard the complexities of 
organizational life and to assume a rather simplistic view on human behavior. Instead, 
humans and therewith managers are considered intrinsically motivated, responsible 
and seen as ‘…collective self-actualizers who achieve utility through organizational 
achievement’ (Davis et al., 1997). If managers are seen as potentially detrimental for 
a firms goals and not as stewards of organizational interests – and hence as stewards 
of holders of a firm’s shares – organizational arrangements to overcome the lacking 
trustworthiness of the managers always impede corporate performance. This 
assumption can be justified by the potential counterproductivity resulting from control 
and mistrust (McGregor, 1960) as well as by the information-biasing effects of 
control as a behavioural strategy (Argyris, 1976). Governance structures aiming at 
preventing managerial misconduct resulting from an inadequate model of man, which 
assumes self-serving behaviour of managers, therefore run the risk of working like a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the evil they are destined to prevent. According to 
stewardship-theory, if instead both managers and principles (shareowners) behave in a 
steward-like way, the potential performance of a firm is maximized. 
Following from these alternative behavioral assumptions, practical implications of 
principal agent theory for corporate governance are challenged and alternative ways 
of steering corporations are recommended. Accordingly, division of the roles of board 
members and CEO – the essence of agency-theory oriented dominant corporate 
governance and seen therein as the mechanism to prevent managerial shirking – does 
inhibit the effective management of a corporation due to insufficient latitude and 
lacking facilitation of effective action. Instead, identity of these roles is seen to 
’…provide benefits of unity of direction and of strong command and control…’ to an 
organization (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
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One credit of stewardship-theory lies in the emphasis on integrity of managerial 
decision-making. Especially in ethical dilemma-situations, flexibility of decision-
making has major advantages in comparison to compliance-based action (Paine, 
1994). From the perspective of motivation and efficiency, assuming the integrity of 
managers seems to be a more prolific approach than expecting misconduct ab initio. 
However, stewardship theory is not able to compensate for the deficit of cognitive 
legitimacy resulting from the potentially weakening influence of regulation on 
corporate conduct, the concomitantly increasing corporate power for two reasons. 
Firstly, the concentration on individual integrity implicitly postulated by steward 
theory harbors the danger of illegitimacy, a fortiori under conditions of expanding 
economic and also political power of managers. This is due to the fact that in absence 
of state regulation, the requirements for corporate self-supply of legitimacy are rising. 
The concentration of power in the hands of the management is a step in the opposite 
direction, since the inclusion of diverse opinions in the process of organizational 
decision-making is potentially curtailed and thus the creation of moral legitimacy is 
impeded. Secondly, the (mostly implicit, for an exception see Donaldson, 1990, p. 
378) reliance on regulatory frameworks renders stewardship theory incapable of 
legitimizing the operations of firms beyond stable regulatory frameworks. 
Stakeholder Theory and Stakeholder Democracy 
     With the work of Freeman (1984), the consideration of different stakeholders of 
firms got framed theoretically. In the aftermath, stakeholder theory was justified for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the consideration of stakeholders was regarded as 
necessary to maximize firm value (Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). On the other 
hand, the observance of stakeholders’ interests got justified for moral reasons: due to 
their intrinsic value, stakeholders are regarded as legitimate beneficiaries of 
corporations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Whereas both of these streams are 
restricted to consider stakeholders in organizational decision-making, the contested 
and value-laden notion of stakeholder democracy (Matten and Crane, 2005b), which 
can be regarded as an extension of stakeholder theories, goes a decisive step further. It 
basically emphasizes the importance of democratic participation in corporate 
decision-making. One strand of argumentation favors democratic involvement in the 
steering of corporations from a motivational point of view. Accordingly, participation 
of stakeholders in organizational decision-making is a means to avoid a ‘hold-up’ 
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problem concerning competitive disadvantages arising from the exclusion of groups 
crucial for value creation from organizational gains. Active participation is seen to 
enhance the motivation of employees and thus corporate performance (Driver and 
Thompson, 2002).  
A second line of argument takes an informational point of view. Thus involvement of 
stakeholders is seen as a means to enhance the capacity of a firm for decision-making 
appropriate to the requirements of complex organizational environments. According 
to Gomez and Korine (2005; 2008), corporate governance developed as a mechanism 
to secure the consent of the individuals governed by corporate actions. Facing 
increasing complexity in the organizational environment, the integration of various 
stakeholders into corporate governance in a democratic way is seen as a way to 
increase the internal organizational complexity and thus rendering a corporation 
capable of surviving in this environment. This is in line with cybernetics-oriented 
considerations. According to Turnbull, open-endedness of hierarchies is flawed due to 
conflicts of interest resulting from a concentration of power, distortion of 
communication and a lack of mechanisms for self-control and self-correction 
(Turnbull, 1994). Furthermore, Gomez and Korine (2008) argue, that corporate 
governance capable of processing information about a complex environment in a 
superior way in turn works as a guarantee towards potential suppliers of capital.  
As shown in Table 2, dominant corporate governance theory as well as – even with a 
different focus – team production theory and stewardship theory concentrate on a 
single authority for organizational decisionmaking. Thus they provide no space for 
compensating the loss of pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy potentially resulting 
from increasing power of firms and operations beyond functioning regulatory 
frameworks. In contrast, suggestions to integrate stakeholders into organizational 
decisionmaking directly aim at changing decision-processes. This means that 
exchange over practices threatening corporate legitimacy can take place – a basic 
requirement for the constitution of moral legitimacy. Besides, compared to the 
theories of corporate governance analyzed before, which are centered on specific 
decision makers or beneficiaries, this theory provides the flexibility to adjust 
decision-processes to the requirements of specific situations, which are manifold and 
dynamic.  
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Table 2: Types of Corporate Governance 
Types of Corporate Governance 
 
dominant 
corporate 
governance 
team-
production 
theory 
stewardsip-
theory 
stakeholder 
democracy  
primary focus of 
corporate 
governance 
protect residual 
claims of 
shareholders,  
enhance efficiency of 
firms; secure the 
supply of new capital 
maximize firm 
value and the 
claims of all team 
members 
enhance efficiency 
of firms 
secure the legitimacy of 
corporate action  
focal group / risk 
takers shareholders 
team members 
(=stakeholders 
contributing to 
value creation) 
shareholders all organizational stakeholders 
role of the state 
strong; enforcement 
of contracts and 
regulation, “police 
power” 
strong; 
enforcement of 
contracts and 
regulation 
strong; 
enforcement of 
contracts and 
regulation 
potentially weak; 
regulatory and capacity 
gaps  
role of the 
corporation purely economic purely economic purely economic economic and political 
reliance on legal 
enforcement of 
contracts 
complete reliance on 
legal enforcement  
potential 
observance of 
implicit contracts 
complete reliance 
on legal 
enforcement 
no reliance on legal 
enforcement 
potential to avoid 
negative 
extrernalities 
no avoidance of 
negative externalities 
possible negative 
externalities resulting 
from corporate 
governance 
partial  avoidance  
of negative 
externalities 
through focus on 
team members 
avoidance  of ne- 
gative externalities 
subject to mana-
gerial discretion 
avoidance of negative 
externalities  
legitmacy of 
corporate political 
activity 
no legitimacy of 
political activity 
no legitimacy of 
political activity 
no legitimacy of 
political activity 
legitimation of political 
activity through 
democratic decision-
making and control 
mode of decision-
making monological monological monological dialogical 
legitimation of 
corporations  
by regulatory 
frameworks                  
+ mainly pragmatic 
by regulatory 
frameworks              
+ mainly pragmatic 
by regulatory 
frameworks              
+ mainly pragmatic 
self-supply if necessary   
(pragmatic/moral) 
authors 
Berle & Means;   
Coase; Friedman; 
Jensen & Meckling  
Blair & Stout; 
Osterloh & Frey 
Donaldson & 
Davis; Davis et al.  
Driver & Thompson; 
Gomez & Korine; 
Parker; Scherer & 
Palazzo; Turnbull 
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FROM CONTRACT TO IMPACT:                                                               
READJUSTIING THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Apparently stakeholder democracy in principle has the flexibility to compensate for 
the loss of corporate legitimacy without referring to regulatory frameworks, to take 
into account negative externalities resulting from corporate action, and to consider the 
increasing corporate power resulting from the private provision of public goods by 
including stakeholders into corporate decision processes. However, this flexibility 
makes it necessary to determine which stakeholders need to be included in 
organizational decision-making to constitute or maintain the legitimacy of corporate 
action. Whereas dominant corporate governance as well as stewardship theory offer a 
simple criterion to select the stakeholders subject to protection by corporate 
governance – namely the imperfect contractual relation between a corporation and the 
stakeholders –, this criterion is not applicable in the face of the individualization of 
corporate risk, potentially including every individual. Thus another selection criterion 
needs to be found. 
The argument that shareholders have contractual ties with a firm – even if imperfect 
ones – is often used to qualify this particular group of stakeholders in contrast to other 
stakeholders for special protection. This understanding of contractual relations is 
centered exclusively on explicit contracts and potential limitations of such contracts 
under specific circumstances. However, this view ignores implicit contracts. Implicit 
contracts are not formalized but nevertheless vital elements of economic transactions. 
Taking into account this type of contract besides explicit contracts facilitates the 
formulation of the relation between firms and an enlarged set of stakeholders in a 
systematic way, as in the case of team production theory. Risk not accounted for in 
explicit contracts thus becomes conspicuous (Boatright, 2009). Nevertheless, despite 
its potential to address numerous legitimate claims towards a corporation, the 
contractarian view has its limits where relations between a corporation and its 
stakeholders are unidirectional, i.e. where no contractual relationship of any nature 
whatsoever exists. Redefining corporate responsibility by extending the notion of 
property rights to ‘both the legal aspect of property rights and the social conventions 
that govern (business) behaviors’ (Asher et al., 2005) seems to be a promising way to 
recognize the importance of a firms stakeholders (Blair, 2005). However, the 
possibility to define all stakeholder relations in terms of contracts and property rights, 
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especially under conditions of cultural heterogeneity and complex global 
interdependencies, seems to be limited.  
Consequently the concept of contract is not suitable to grasp the multiple relationships 
of corporations and stakeholders. A further starting point is the concept of 
accountability. ‘An accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or 
other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the 
ability to impose costs on the agent’ (Keohane, 2003, p. 139). In traditional corporate 
governance theory the residual risk borne by shareholders is taken as a justification 
for the corporate obligation to report to shareholders – corporate accountability. 
Corporate accountability is regarded as a way to inform shareholders and enable them 
to control corporations directly in the general assembley or indirectly via the financial 
markets. However, taking into account the increasingly widespread risk resulting 
from corporate action it becomes apparent that the exclusive confinement of corporate 
accountability to shareholders seemingly disregards numerous equally legitimate 
claims. Thus this confinement of corporate accountability to corporate shareholders 
seems to be not justified any more. In the light of the increasingly blurring line 
between between political and economic actors (Crane and Matten, 2008; Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006; Scherer& Palazzo, 2007) and the concurrent 
increase of corporate power, the application of a broader conception of accountability 
seems to be adequate. According to Keohane (2003, p. 140), there are three normative 
criteria justifying and necessitating the accountability of an actor towards specific 
groups: authorization, support, and impact. Authorization defined as the conferring of 
rights from one entity to another is seen as one normative reason for the duty of the 
authorized to be accountable to the authorizer. Political as well as financial support 
are regarded as further justifying obligation of the supported to be accountable vis-à-
vis the supporters. The third criterion – impact – is argued to be a further justification 
for accountability. As argued by Held (2002), actors who become ‘choice-
determining’ for others and thus restricting the autonomy of these actors need to be 
held accountable. The issue of accountability in dominant corporate governance was 
exclusively centered on the criterion of support. Shareholders provide financial 
support for a corporation and in turn the corporation is supposed to be accountable to 
these shareholders. In the light of the increasing economic and political power of 
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corporations, often exercised unidirectionally, the criterion of impact is becoming 
increasingly relevant since corporations determine choices of many people. 
However, due to the complexitiy of global exchange- and power-relations, the impact 
of specific actions on the constraint of individual choice is increasingly difficult to 
determine in a direct way.  Impact in most instances does not happen directly, but 
through intricate cause-effect chains. Thus, to develop a concept of impact capable of 
embracing this complexity and intermediateness, we relate to the notion of social 
connectedness. Following Iris Marion Young (2004), to counter increasing structural 
injustice – and therewith the constraint of individual choice – resulting from social 
and economic connectedness in a globalized economy, it is necessary to overcome a 
past-oriented liability logic. Instead, she introduces the forward-looking concept of 
social connectedness. Accordingly, involvement in structures leading to injustice is 
regarded as a sufficient condition to consider an actor responsible for this injustice. 
Individual decisions are constrained due to the impact of this actor’s actions. This 
becomes even more important taking into account that corporations not only impact 
individuals within economic exchange-relationships beyond regulatory frameworks 
but also through the provision of public goods. Under such circumstances impact can 
not be determined following the logic of liability. Defining the impact of corporations 
according to the social connectedness perspective in a forward-looking manner is a 
fruitful approach to adequately determine the scope of corporate accountability. 
Corporate governance, which plays a central role for securing corporate 
accountability, has to adapt to the changed economic and political operating 
conditions of corporations. Instead of being centered on the protection of corporate 
shareholders, it needs to secure corporate accountability towards all affected by 
corporate action, even in indirect manner. The notion of social connectedness can be 
the basis to formulate the specifications of such an extended conceptualization of 
corporate governance, transcending the narrow focus on contractual relations. It 
enables to specify stakeholders towards which a corporation has to be accountable, 
allowing for the influence of these stakeholders on organizational decision-making 
and thus for the generation of moral legitimacy. 
In the context of the discussion about the nature and limits of the corporate 
responsibility for stakeholders Goodpaster argues that extending the fiduciary 
relationship between shareholders and management to an inclusion of stakeholders 
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would represent the transformation of the modern private corporation into a public 
institution that “probably calls for a corresponding restructuring of corporate 
governance” (Goodpaster, 1991, p. 66). Firstly, the severity of such a transformation, 
blurring the traditional corporate goals, prompts him to deny the existence of 
fiduciary obligations of managers vis-à-vis stakeholders other than shareowners. 
Secondly, the adverse implications for the efficiency of organizational decision-
making – a push “towards paralysis” – are mentioned as a reason for this denial. 
However, in the light of the increasingly political nature of corporate action described 
above (Matten and Crane 2005a; Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Scherer et al. 2006), the 
first concern loses some of its relevance. In the reverse conclusion, it rather implies 
that the governance of corporations increasingly acting beyond national regulatory 
frameworks and involved in political action requires a revision. Thus the second 
concern – considerations of efficiency within extended governance relations – alone 
cannot be seen as a decisive obstacle for the modification of corporate governance. In 
contrast, it can be understood as a guideline for the modification of traditional 
corporate governance. 
In summary, it becomes evident that traditional corporate governance as well as 
alternative conceptions in many instances fall short of taking into account the 
fundamental changes in the economic as well as in the political sphere. By 
concentrating on contractual relations between corporations and stakeholders, the 
contingent legitimate claims vis-à-vis a corporation, which are not subject to any 
contract whatsoever, can not be addressed in a comprehensive way since these claims 
are assumed to be met by the regulatory framework and not by a corporation itself. 
Confrontation with this problem can be described as an enormous increase in 
complexity of decision for corporations. In times of sufficient state regulation 
economic rationality (i.e. profit-maximizing behaviour) was the only focus necessary 
for corporate decision-making. Societal welfare was achieved firstly by economic 
decision-making (via the invisible hand) and secondly by the regulatory framework, 
setting the side-conditions for the economic activity. However, in situations where 
regulatory frameworks only work insufficiently, corporations increasingly need to 
consider societal (side-)effects of their operations and thus have to be able to switch 
to social rationality (i.e. concurrent resolution of conflicts; see Habermas, 1984) to 
maintain or reconstitute their legitimacy.  
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CONSTITUTING LEGITIMACY BY DELIBERATION: THE ROLE FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
    As we have argued, corporations acting beyond functioning regulatory frameworks 
or taking over governmental functions can no longer rely on regulatory frameworks to 
provide legitimacy. Furthermore we showed that – as a result of this stuation – the 
scope of dominant corporate governance theory and practice needs to be readjusted to 
maintain or reconstitute corporate legitimacy in such cases. The question remains how 
corporate governance can be made responsive for changed legitimacy requirements. 
Therefore in the following we propose the opening up of corporate governance 
structures for communicative processes as a means to contribute to the generation of 
moral legitimacy. Thus we concretize a more general suggestion to manage 
legitimacy of organizations in a procedural communication-based way proposed by 
Palazzo and Scherer (2006). Referring firstly to the threefold concept of legitimacy by 
Suchman (1995) described above – pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy – 
these authors argue that under the conditions of globalization and the post-national 
constellation the capability of business to constitute pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy 
is decreasing. Secondly, the authors draw on the concept of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas, 1998; Dryzek, 1999). In the theory of deliberative democracy, 
deliberation is conceptualized as a network of argumentation aiming at controlling 
administrative power by finding rational and fair solutions for problems (Habermas, 
1996). In a transfer of this theory from political science to the context of organizations 
(Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), deliberation is regarded as a 
means for corporations to compensate for the loss of pragmatic and cognitive 
legitimacy. Switching to a mode of 'moral reasoning' is regarded as a measure to 
constitute moral legitimacy by means of discursive processes when necessary and 
appropriate. The process of deliberation is seen as a way to achieve legitimate 
outcomes by the exchange of good reasons. Thereby an active justification vis-à-vis 
society replaces the mere reactive isomorphic conformance with societal demands or 
the strategic manipulation of the perceptions of stakeholders (e.g. by means of 
instrumental public relations) (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2008).  
In the following we specify the reasons for the centrality of corporate governance for 
generating organizational legitimacy and thereby substantiate that corporate 
governance structures need to be changed if corporations aim at generating legitimacy 
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by discursive means. According to Gomez and Korine (2008), corporate governance 
is the level of a firm where the processes need to take place which safeguard as well 
as signal the fairness of corporate action. Implicitly referring to the ‘Law of Requisite 
Variety’ by W. Ross Ashby (1971) and thus arguing by means of the increased 
capacity of stakeholder democracy to collect and process information, they suggest 
the increase of the complexity of corporate governance by democratization as a 
suitable means to tackle the rising complexity of organizational environments and to 
control major risks in an efficient and credible way. Therewith, the central role of 
corporate governance for managing environmental complexity and simultaneously 
signalling the capacity to do so is emphasized.  
However, assuming that there is a trade off between organizational legitimacy and 
efficiency (Oliver, 1991; Thompson, 2008), it is necessary to consider the effects of a 
democratization of corporate governance on both aspects in detail. At the one 
extreme, reform of corporate governance rules in favor of stakeholders (Maitland, 
2001) and broad democratic deliberation are regarded as inhibiting organizational 
efficiency (Thompson, 2008). While such reforms have the potential to contribute to 
organizational legitimacy, they simultaneously harbour the danger of a deadlock 
inhibiting organizational survival in complex environments. At the other extreme, it is 
argued that inclusion of diverse stakeholders enhances organizational efficiency 
(Deetz, 2007). Assuming that the effect of deliberation on organizational efficiency 
depends on the concrete design of communication practices (Deetz, 2007) and that 
legitimacy as well as efficiency accounts compete with respect to resources but also 
complement each other as to the viability of organizations (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Scott, 2001, p. 157), it can be shown that the relation of organizational 
efficiency and legitimacy is neither wholly antagonistic nor wholly complementary.  
Rather both aspects can be regarded as the outcomes of the very same  
communicative processes. The democratization of corporate governance thus has the 
potential to enhance organizational legitimacy as well as efficiency, if both 
antagonistic and complementary aspects of their relationship are considered in the 
design of organizational structures and processes.   
A step towards such a redesign of corporate governance can be based on findings 
from strategic management theory, which highlight the relevance dialogical processes 
for reducing environmental complexity and thus securing organizational survival 
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(Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987; Steinmann & Kustermann, 1998). Therein it is 
argued, that the opening of organizations for continous communicative processes with 
their environments decisively improves information acquisition, thereby enhances 
sensitivity for strategic threats and thus ultimately increases organizational efficiency. 
This view contradicts classical organization science, according to which organizations 
are conceptionalized as rational constructs with the sole purpose of revenue-
generation (Taylor, 1911), steered by a single authority. The rationality of an 
organization was concentrated in this single instance – and hence termed monological 
–, implicitly assuming the a priori correctness of plans as well as the the feasibility of 
these plans. However, this view completely ignores the limits of individual rationality 
(see Simon, 1948) as well as the complexity and dynamic of organizational 
environments. In contrast, in modern theory of strategic management, the replacement 
of strategic planning oriented to a Tailorist monological rationality by a process-
oriented dialogical type of rationality (Steinmann and Kustermann, 1998) is 
advocated. Referring to Juergen Habermas (1984), dialogical rationality can be 
regarded as the outcome of communicative processes. Such processes can be seen as a 
means to contribute to the survival of an organization and to tackle the complexity of 
organizational environments in a way superior to the monological solution due to the 
increased capacity to collect and process information.  
Therefore it can be argued that an organization generally needs to be able to 
communicate with its environment on all levels. The question is on which particular 
organizational levels such communicative processes need to take place. Firstly, on 
every hierarchical level members of an organization need to be able to identify 
conflicts with the organizational environment, since early detection of problems 
allows for early reaction and enhances the flexibility to respond appropriately 
(Ansoff, 1984; Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987). Secondly, they need to be authorized 
and able to make decisions based on dialogue with persons or groups affected by 
corporate actions in a flexible way to avoid harm and thus potential threats for 
organizational legitimacy. Furthermore, the necessity for such decentrality follows 
from the potential threat to organizational efficiency resulting from potential overload 
of decision capacities and diverging interests on the top decision level. Thus processes 
aiming at the legitimization of a corporation by opening up for deliberation need to 
take place on all operational levels of a firm. This is due to reasons of the efficacy of 
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these deliberative processes themselves as well as due to the effects of such processes 
on organizational efficiency.  
On the other hand though, such decentralized mechanisms alone do not guarantee for 
a corporation to constitute and maintain legitimacy in a deliberative way. Therefore 
the location of such processes on the level of corporate governance seems to be 
appropriate for several reasons. It can be shown that the construction logic of 
dominant corporate governance exhibits parallels to the monological rationality 
described above. Arguing that ‘multiple objectives is no objective’ (Jensen, 2001), 
traditional conceptions of corporate governance postulate the necessity of 
shareholder-value and the resulting single-valued objective function as a condition 
necessary for the manageability of corporations. However, referring to exactly the 
monological rationality described above, this position overlooks the limits of rational 
human behavior as well as the complexity and dynamic of organizational 
envioronments. A deliberation-based conception of corporate governance by contrast 
can be regarded as a means to achieve dialogical rationality. Accordingly, rendering 
corporate governance qualified to contribute to the constitution of dialogical 
rationality and hence moral legitimacy can be regarded as being potentially suitable to 
increase information processing capacity and thus organizational efficiency as well. 
Furthermore, the suggestion to secure organizational legitimacy by opening up 
corporate governance for discursive processes can be justified from a normative 
perspective. As argued above, corporations increasingly take over functions of the 
state (Matten & Crane, 2005). Following this parallel, corporate governance can be 
conceived of as the level, on which rules are established. This can be regarded as 
analogous to the legislative function of states. As shown by Habermas (1998), rule of 
law can only claim legitimacy under conditions of democracy. From this perspective 
follows directly that an entity which exercises power in a law-like manner needs to be 
subject to democratic control to be able to claim legitimacy. Based on these normative 
considerations, it can be argued from a more technical perspective that the highest 
level of corporate decision-making – corporate governance – is one necessary element 
in the process of corporate legitimization beyond functioning regulatory frameworks. 
First, responsibility needs to be easily localized and identified by shareholders as well 
as by the general public. Therefore, an identifiable mechanism is necessary to signal 
trustworthyness and establish confidence in the governance of corporations (Gomez 
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& Korine, 2008), thereby securing organizational legitimacy. Second, the upper 
echelons in corporations wield the most power – in economic and increasingly also in 
political respect. On top management level it is decided whether or not data are 
signalling strategic threats and fundamental directions in the course of strategic 
decision making are selected (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 
1987), also beyond purely economic considerations (Carpenter et al., 2004). Third, 
there is a possibility of failure of deliberative processes on lower levels. Distortions in 
moral deliberation resulting from the hierarchical structure of firms and causing a 
diffusion of personal responsibility (Rhee, 2008) cannot be ruled out.  Therefore some 
kind of guarantee equivalent to a court of last resort is necessary to provide the 
possibility of changing the direction of corporate activity. Fourth, there is need for a 
well-defined and designated interface to the discourses of civil society to guarantee 
the receptivity of a firm for legitimate demands vis-à-vis a corporation. This seems to 
be the potential role for corporate governance in a framework aiming at a corporation 
capable of constituting dialogical rationality and therewith legitimacy. 
However, on the one hand, to counter negative consequences for organizational 
efficiency, processes of decision-making concerning the core activities of a 
corporation and higher-level processes of deliberation constituting organizational 
legitimacy have to be buffered against each other to some extent (Scherer et al., 
2008). This means that deliberative processes need to take place parallel to and 
independent from routine decision processes when appropriate to avoid mutual 
intereference of these two processes beyond the level necessary to safeguard 
organizational legitimacy. On the other hand, decoupling of these two processes 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) aiming at the generation of legitimacy without change of 
critical practices needs to be avoided. One practical suggestion pointing in this 
direction and concerning corporate justice plans and possibilities for stakeholders to 
contest corporate decisions is mentioned by Parker (2002). However, this solution 
stipulates access to justice as an ultimate option and is therefore only of limited use 
under conditions of a weak or absent regulatory framework. A further reaching 
suggestion concerns the modification of corporate governance structures towards a 
four-tier system. Within such a system, the interplay of the shareholder meeting, a 
social or works council, the board of directors, and a corporate senate is regarded as a 
way to include all legitimate claims of stakeholders in processes of organizational 
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decision-making (Driver and Thompson, 2002) and might lead in the direction of full 
corporate accountability beyond the boundaries of law. Guide for the design of such a 
‘fourth power’ within corporations could be suggestions to connect political decision-
making with societal discourses within a ‘chamber of discourses’ (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2008). 
 
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite being far apart from realization, seemingly there are no less fundamental 
ways to restore the capacity of corporations in general and of corporate governance in 
particular to maintain the legitimacy of corporations and of the system of market-
economy in a way appropriate to the conditions of heterogeneous complex 
environments and the increasingly politicized role of business. In the face of 
fundamental changes in their environment and a shift in the division of labor between 
the private and the political sphere, corporations are increasingly confronted with the 
problem of diminishing legitimacy. In the pre-globalization era intact regulatory 
frameworks guaranteed the congruence of profitmaking and social welfare. Contracts 
were reliable, negative externalities were limited by law and the provision of public 
goods was a public task fulfilled by public authorities. With the diminishing of public 
steering power and the widening of regulation gaps, these assumptions are becoming 
increasingly unfounded. In many cases, the enforceability of contracts can be 
doubted. The limitation of negative externalities by state authorities is becoming 
increasingly difficult due to the global reach of corporate power, the range of many 
negative externalities transcending national borders and the weakening of national 
regulatory frameworks. The distinction between the private and the public sphere is 
blurring because of the fact that corporations often participate or independently 
engage in the provision of public goods. Summing up, these developments constitute 
an increase in corporate power and thus a higher risk for those affected by this power. 
This inter alia results in immensely increased requirements for corporations to 
maintain and restore their legitimacy. Corporate governance has the potential to 
secure organizational legitimacy and thereby also the legitimacy of the economic 
system as a whole, particularly in the light of the strengthening of global civil society. 
Whereas traditional corporate governance was able to achieve organizational and 
systems-level legitimacy by protecting the shareholders in a monological way, this 
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does not apply to the current situation of increased economic and political power of 
corporations in a post-national world. To restore and maintain organizational and 
systems-level legitimacy, corporate governance needs to open up for contingent 
legitimate claims towards a corporation. The transfer of the concept of deliberative 
democracy to the corporate level in general and to corporate governance in particular 
is a promising way to re-establish legitimacy in a dialogical way. However, the way 
towards the democratically accountable corporation is still long. On organizational 
level, ways need to be found to process and balance legitimate claims towards an 
organization and organizational efficiency. For this purpose, the relationship of 
efficiency and legitimacy needs to be analyzed in detail. Furthermore, of foremost 
importance is the analysis and design of modes of interaction and communication 
between corporate governance and civil society, which lead to an appropriate 
balancing of organizational efficiency and legitimacy. 
On the systems-level another problem might impede the enhancement of corporate 
accountability: systems-level legitimacy is not completely established by the mere 
generation of firm-specific legitimacy. The debate about the sphere of influence of 
business (Human Rights Council, 2008) is exemplary for this incongruence. Even if a 
firm behaves correctly within a sphere where illegitimate behavior could be attributed 
to the firm and therefore damage its legitimacy, the firm still might cause illegitimate 
behavior beyond this sphere, e.g. in complex supply chains, without venturing its 
individual legitimacy. Each individual firm could take an advantage from opting out 
of contributing to the legitimacy of the economic system. Therefore systems-level 
legitimacy can be regarded as a public good and a problem of collective action occurs. 
Future research is necessary to assess the compatibility of current conceptions of the 
sphere of influence with the aforementioned concept of political responsibility 
(Young, 2004), which seems one way to escape this problem of collective action. 
Practical approaches towards resolving this problem could lie in the establishment of 
schemes of effective self-regulation. Initiatives to foster corporate commitment (for a 
systematic analysis of different types of commitment see Pies et al., 2009) and 
thereby facilitate collective action – like the United-Nations Global Compact and the 
Global Reporting Initiative as well as sector-specific initiatives like the Equator 
Principles for responsible project financing – point in this direction. However, 
knowledge of the organizational implications of corporate engagement in such 
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schemes is still limited. The optimal design of such approaches (and their anchoring 
in the corporate governance of firms in particular) as well as the limits of such 
approaches thus requires further investigation. As such initiatives are still far from 
being widespread and binding and since their efficacy still has to turn out, the 
legitimacy of the economic system is in decline as rising dissatisfaction with 
capitalism (Globescan, 2009) shows. 
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